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Abstract 
While the body of literature concerning voter 
participation continues to grow there has been a lack 
of research into the attitudes and behaviors of 
Hispanics in the United States. To address this 
disparity in the literature I use the 2012 National 
Election Study Survey to find support for a Hispanic 
shift from the right to the left of the political 
spectrum. I find that Hispanics support the Democratic 
Party more than Whites on moral values and foreign 
policy, but not on economic issues. Hispanics are also 
more likely than Blacks to support the Democratic 
Party on foreign policy, but not moral values or 
economics. While my findings support the conclusions 
of previous authors, less support can be found for the 
types of shifts that V.O. Key described in Critical 
Election Theory. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
It was the Greek philosopher Plato who once said, "One 
of the penalties for refusing to participate in politics is 
that you end up being governed by your inferiors." Almost 
two-hundred forty years after American independence, this 
is a quote that holds real meaning for a large portion of 
the country. Only 57.5% of eligible voters went to the 
polls in the 2012 election compared to 60.4% in the 2004 
election, and 62.3% in the 2008 election (CNN Wire 2012). 
While there may not look like much of a difference between 
57% and 62%, the total of voting eligible population in the 
United States was around 225 million in 2012. Five percent 
of all eligible voters in 2012 represent over 11 million 
votes that were not cast. The margin of victory for 
candidate Obama in 2012 was less than half of that (United 
States Election Project 2013). The likelihood that enough 
of those voters would have gone for candidate Romney is 
slim, but it gives one pause to the importance of voting in 
general elections. 
What caused a drop in voting participation from the 
2008 to the 2012 election? The election of 2008 was 
exciting for Americans for many reasons. For the first time 
in history Americans chose an African American, Democrat 
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Barack Obama, for President of the United States. Along 
with taking back the White House after eight years of the 
Bush presidency, Democrats also expanded their control of 
the House of Representatives by 21 seats, and the Senate by 
eight seats. The Democrats looked to be invincible heading 
into Obama's first term. Much of the credit for Obama's 
victory was given to the Black community, where Obama won 
95% of the vote. African-Americans make up 13% of the 
population of the United States (CNN Election Center 2008). 
With that type of dominance it is easy to see why Obama won 
handily. However, this is not the only minority he was able 
to woo during the election cycle. I will argue that 
Hispanic voters are becoming one of the most sought after 
votes in presidential elections. 
Hispanic voters make up 17% of the population. Obama 
garnered 67% of the Latino vote in 2008, a figure which 
grew to 71% in 2012. This is astounding considering that 
his predecessor John Kerry was only able to gather 58% in 
the 2004 presidential election (Lopez and Taylor 2012). 
There have been some variations in Hispanic voting over 
time. Obama was able to shift the tables more in the 
Democratic Party's f~vor with Latino voters. Not since Bill 
Clinton had the Democratic Party shared such a large 
percentage of the Hispanic vote. 
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What is it about the Democratic Party that draws a 
larger number of Hispanics? The Democratic Party has been a 
leader on "bread and butter" domestic issues, such 
immigration reform, the economy, and healthcare reform. All 
of these are issues with which lower-income Hispanic voters 
can identify. In more recent elections, the Democratic 
Party has also been able to win over some initial 
supporters of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because 
continued spending and ill-defined goals have turned off 
some Latinos who may have originally supported the 
conflicts. 
Second, the regional concentration of Hispanics should 
not be ignored when examining Democratic support. Many 
Latino communities are in larger cities, as is the case 
with African Americans. Larger cities tend to vote 
Democratic overwhelmingly. Region is also important in 
determining Hispanic country of origin. Contrary to popular 
belief, not all Hispanics vote the same way. The American 
Southwest has a large concentration of Mexican and Central 
American Hispanics. This region has shown a tendency to 
lean Democratic in recent years. On the East coast and in 
the Midwest, especially around cities like Chicago, there 
are Puerto Rican immigrants. They, too, tend to be 
Democratic. However, Cuban immigrants in Florida lean to 
3 
the right. Given the relatively small number of Cuban 
Americans, and the Republican's success in the state of 
Florida, it is unlikely that the bulk of Hispanic votes 
Kerry received came from Cuban Americans. 
What were the primary causes of this Democratic surge 
in the polls? How did minority voting behavior affect the 
outcome? More specifically, what role did Hispanic voters 
play in the elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012? Has Hispanic 
voting behavior changed from prior elections? After 
reviewing the literature on voting behavior, I will 
formulate a quantitative argument based on data from the 
American National Election Studies. By using a critical 
election theory framework, I will show that strong 
Democratic candidates are able to draw Hispanic voters away 
from the Republican Party. Obama was able to do this by 
including Hispanics in his vision of change for America. On 
the other hand, his rival John McCain was unable to 
capitalize on the Hispanic vote, despite being from a 
southwestern state. 
The second chapter of this thesis will review the 
literature on voting behavior and Hispanic voting behavior 
specifically. I will cover both because the area of 
Hispanic voting behavior is still relatively new and little 
literature exists on the subject. The third chapter will 
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examine the roots of critical election theory and make a 
case for its use in this analysis. The fourth chapter of 
this thesis reports my data, methods, and hypotheses for my 
analysis. My fifth chapter will run a series of OLS 
regressions using data from the American National Election 
Studies to examine and analyze Hispanic attitudes about the 
Democratic candidate for president in 2012. The sixth and 
final section of this paper will present a discussion of 
implications pending questions that grow out of this work. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Researchers have been studying voting behavior among 
whites and African Americans for a long time. The 
literature on Hispanic voting is still very young, but it 
has deep roots in work that dates back to the 1950s. 
However, this early literature lacked strong empirical 
support due to the limitations of quantitative data at the 
time. Even though the American Institute of Public Opinion 
was founded in 1935 by George Gallup, it wasn't until 1958 
that it was modernized. This is not to say that early work 
was not sophisticated or important. 
It is impossible to overlook the work of V.O. Key 
(1955, 1959) who was a pioneer in the field of voting and 
elections. Key (1955) asserts that, "In behavior antecedent 
to voting, elections differ in the proportions of the 
electorate psychologically involved, in the intensity of 
attitudes associated with the campaign cleavages, in the 
nature of expectations about the consequences of the 
voting, in the impact of the objective events relevant to 
individual political choice, in individual sense of 
effective connection with community decision, and in other 
ways" (p. 3). 
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Key also makes an early distinction that may play a 
part in this analysis of Hispanic voters. Key (1959) says 
that, "A secular shift in party attachment may be regarded 
as a movement of the members of a population category from 
party to party that extends over several presidential 
elections and appears to be independent of the peculiar 
factors influencing the vote at individual elections" (p. 
199). As I will examine later, Hispanic voter support 
appears to shift from the Democratic to the Republican 
Party as the strength of the Democratic candidate waxes and 
wanes. 
Axelrod (1972) asks the important question, where do 
Democrats and Republicans get their votes from? To answer 
this question he examines voter coalition formation, and he 
discovers that, "Democrats are a coalition of diverse 
overlapping minorities: the poor, Blacks, union members, 
Catholics and Jews, Southerners, and city dwellers." Note 
that Hispanics are not specifically listed, despite high 
support for the Democratic Party. However, a large 
percentage of Hispanics are Catholic, and they are readily 
identified as Democratic supporters. Axelrod (1972) 
attributes the Catholic support for Democrats to the 1960 
election of John F. Kennedy and their loyal turnout (p.16). 
He concludes that, "There is little that a party can do to 
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increase the size of a demographic group, but there is much 
it can do to try to its turnout and loyalty" (p.19). 
A host of different researchers on voting behavior 
(Filer, Kenny, and Morton, 1993; Godbout and Belanger, 
2007; Gomez and Wilson, 2001, 2007; Kramer, 1971; Lynch, 
1999; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001) have advanced economic 
arguments to explain voter's decisions. This is one of the 
most prevalent discussions in the voting behavior 
literature. It is by no means the only argument being made. 
Kramer (1971) founded his economic argument concerning 
voting behavior between the elections of 1896 and 1964. He 
incorporates a complex statistical model that assumes that 
a voter will not always chose to vote "rationally" but will 
vote for the incumbent party if performance is 
"satisfactory" and will vote against them if their 
performance is unsatisfactory. In terms of congressional 
elections specifically, Kramer (1971) finds that, "economic 
fluctuations, in particular, are important influences on 
congressional elections, with economic upturn helping the 
congressional candidates of the incumbent party and 
economic decline benefitting the opposition" (p. 141) . I 
argue this argument is too calculated, as it leaves no room 
for partisan attitudes prior to voting. 
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Filer, Kenny, and Morton (1993) build a model that 
reconciles the positive association between income and 
voting with the negative correlation between income and 
voter turnout over time. Their data include voter turnout 
rates for the 1948, 1960, 1968, and 1980 elections. They 
conclude that their, "theory predicts that the absolute 
level of real income and the voter's level of relative 
income compared with other voters have separate effects on 
voter participation" (p. 80). 
Lynch (1999) tests the stability of the relationship 
between the economy and presidential elections over time 
using aggregated economic data. She finds that, "it appears 
that voters have rewarded GNP growth and stable prices 
between 1872 and 1946, but voters have become increasing 
sensitive to changes in GNP since 1946" (p. 841). This 
raises questions about the election of 2000 and how well 
the Democratic Party was rewarded for the continued 
economic success of the United States. An argument based 
solely on economics doesn't seem sufficient to explain 
anomalies like these. 
In the subfield of voting behavior there are a host of 
economic arguments being made by various authors. Gomez and 
Wilson (2001, 2007) advance an economic argument that draws 
criticism from Godbout and Belanger (2007). This sort of 
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exchange back and forth in an argument is rare in 
contemporary political science, but is precisely what needs 
to take place to determine the merits of research. Gomez 
and Wilson (2001) first argue that low voting sophisticates 
rely on economic judgments to determine support for the 
incumbent party candidate, while Godbout and Belanger 
(2007) argue that the results do not hold for either low or 
high sophisticates if the post-electoral reported vote is 
used as the dependent variable. Responding to this 
criticism, Gomez and Wilson (2007) pen a short piece 
explaining their rationale. They say that the criticism 
ignores their subsequent work which backs up their results. 
Although economic considerations are not part of my initial 
argument they are important to remember when considering 
voting behavior. 
The literature on Hispanic voting behavior is still in 
its infancy as far as literature in political science goes. 
Many previous works would only address Hispanics as a side 
note to a larger study on African American or Anglo 
American voting behavior. Despite this, there is a growing 
emphasis on Hispanic voting behavior, especially since the 
highly contested election in 2000. Hispanic votes are 
coveted by both parties because their votes would make the 
difference between defeat and victory. 
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Bass and Casper (2001) start with one of the most 
basic questions about Hispanic voting behavior, who 
registers to vote and who votes among naturalized 
Americans. They use data from the Voting and Registration 
Supplement in the 1996 Current Population Survey. They are 
looking to see if region of origin and length of residency 
in the United States have an effect on the likelihood of 
registering and voting among naturalized citizens. They 
find that older naturalized citizens with longer length at 
their current residence, as well as higher educated 
naturalized citizens are more likely to register, and are 
more likely to vote in elections. 
One of the first studies to use actual data collected 
on Hispanics was performed by Cassel (2002). She is looking 
at the distinctiveness of Hispanic voter participation. The 
main focus of the research is whether immigrant Latinos who 
come to the United States and maintain proximity to their 
home country, that is to say they live in the South or 
Southwest, vote at the same rate as other ethnicities. She 
finds that in midterm elections and lower level elections 
there is a definitive drop in voting. However, in 
presidential elections, these Latinos vote at similar rates 
to whites and blacks of similar socio-economic status. 
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Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) argue that research 
focusing largely on descendants of white immigrants may be 
heavily biased toward sociological reasons for the 
development of partisan attitudes. They use a telephone 
survey to study the partisan affiliations of Hispanic 
voters to see if they are more explicitly political than 
white voters. The authors point out that national studies 
like the ANES or Gallup polls contain few Latinos, and this 
can cause problems with generalization because they are not 
nationally representative. 
Uhlaner, Gray, and Garcia (2000) use the Latino 
National Political Survey, which shows that policy 
positions affect Hispanic party identification more than 
ideology or demographics. Their results indicate that 
Latino partisanship develops over time and that younger 
voters tend to be more independent while older voters tend 
to have more established partisan attachments. 
Claassen (2004) asks more meaningful questions about 
the group agreement of Hispanics by introducing his theory 
of Hispanic Distinctiveness. His research looks at whether 
Hispanic self-identifiers are similar enough in their 
political preference to be analyzed as a group, and if that 
is the case, are Hispanics dissimilar enough from other 
minority ethnic groups to be analyzed separately. He does 
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this by looking at socio-economic variables from the 
National Election Study data. He concludes that Hispanics 
share inter-group opinions and their opinions are 
distinctive from other groups, such as Anglos and blacks. 
Barreto (2007) shifts the research in a new direction 
by looking at Latino candidates in mayoral elections. He 
tests whether candidate ethnicity impacts Latino voting 
behavior. He looks at elections in five major U.S. cities 
(Los Angeles, Houston, New York, San Francisco, and Denver) 
to determine if Latinos were mobilized by co-ethnic 
candidates. His results show that precincts with no Latino 
candidate on the ballot are less likely to mobilize Latino 
voters. The presence of a viable Latino candidate results 
in increased Latino voter turnout in Latino precincts. 
Kenski and Tisinger (2006) narrow the focus of 
Hispanic voting behavior to the presidential elections in 
2000 and 2004. Their specific focus is on the demographics 
George W. Bush was able to gain votes from in two elections 
where he won by a narrow margin. Their data comes from the 
2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) to 
examine the extent to which Bush was able to make gains 
with Hispanics. The results indicate that Bush was able to 
improve support among Latino voters in 2004, which explains 
the wider gap than in the highly contested election of 
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2000. They note that while Bush improved support among 
Hispanics, Hispanic party identification was comparable to 
its level in 2000. 
One of the most recent works is by Abrajano, Alvarez, 
and Negler (2008), analyzing at the 2004 presidential 
election. Their work contributes to the growing literature 
by applying theories of issue and economic voting to a 
nationwide survey of Hispanics for the first time. As they 
point out (p. 369) no previous work in 30 years of research 
has included Hispanic voting behavior. The data they 
utilize is a statewide aggregation of the National Election 
Pool (NEP) . They are able to demonstrate that Latinos are 
similar to Anglos in that issues and ideology are highly 
influential in vote choice. They also demonstrate that 
moral values and national security were more important to 
Hispanics than the economy or education. This, they say, 
accounts for gains beyond the overall increase in Bush's 
vote share from 2000 to 2004. 
14 
Chapter 3: Theoretica1 Ana1ysis 
This chapter focuses on trends in Hispanic voting for 
the Democratic Party and provides support for the theory 
that undergirds my analysis. It is my belief that gains in 
Hispanic votes for the Democratic Party will ultimately 
lead to a realignment where the Democratic Party wins the 
Presidency with consistency. 
Table 1 below shows the percentage of Hispanic vote by 
party for elections going back to the 1980 election between 
Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. I argue that strong 
Democratic candidates will do better among Latino voters 
than weaker Democratic candidates will. I will define a 
strong Democratic candidate as one that is able to win the 
majority of Electoral College votes in an election. The 
data in this table bear this out for the most part. Our 
first instinct may be to look at the percentage the 
Democrat received from election to election. This is 
deceiving because, although it fluctuates, it essentially 
levels out after 1988. Democratic candidates have 
consistently received more than 60% of the Hispanic vote 
since 1984, when Mondale garnered 61%. 
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Table 1: Percentage Difference in Hispanic Vote Since 1980 
Election Year Democratic Republican % 
9-0 9-0 Difference 
Carter v. Reagan 56% 35% 21% 
1980 
Mondale v. Reagan 61% 37% 24% 
1984 
Dukakis v. Bush 69% 30% 39% 
1988 
Clinton v. Bush 61% 25% 36% 
1992 
Clinton v. Dole 72% 21% 51% 
1996 
Gore v. Bush 62% 35% 27% 
2000 
Kerry v. Bush 58% 40% 18% 
2004 
Obama v. McCain 67% 31% 36% 
2008 
Obama v. Romney 71% 27% 44% 
2012 
*Data from the Pew Hispanic Center 2012 
The only exception to this was in the 2004 election where 
John Kerry was only able to get 58% of the Hispanic vote. 
The 2004 election is also the narrowest the gap between the 
two parties has been since 1980. It is much more accurate 
to look at the percentage difference between the Democratic 
and Republican parties over the different elections to get 
a sense of how Republican candidates have been able to take 
away support for the Democratic Party. If, as I argue, 
strong Democratic candidates will gather a greater majority 
of Latino votes it should be evident in the percent 
difference column. 
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I argue that strong Democratic candidates will do 
better among Latino candidates than weaker Democrats. By 
this definition, all strong Democratic candidates have gone 
on to the presidency of the United States. This is evident 
by looking at the elections in 1992 and 1996 where Bill 
Clinton won 36% (61% to 25%) when running against George 
H.W. Bush. Support among Latino voters rose to 51% (72% to 
21%) in the 1996 election against Bob Dole. This is a swing 
of 15% over four years. Barack Obama can be viewed as a 
strong Democratic candidate, as we see this pattern again 
in the 2008 and 2012 elections. In 2008, Barack Obama 
received 36% more of the Hispanic vote (67% to 31%) than 
Republican challenger John McCain, who is from Arizona. 
Arizona has a considerable Hispanic population. In the 2008 
election, Obama only fared as well as his predecessor John 
Kerry in 2004, gathering 56% in the state. However, Obama 
was about to widen that margin in 2012 to 74% of the state 
Hispanic vote. In the 2012 election at the national level, 
Obama held a 44% lead in Hispanic votes (71% to 27%) over 
Mitt Romney. One major outlier of this trend is in the 1988 
election between Michael Dukakis and George H.W. Bush. 
Dukakis was able to maintain a margin of 39% over Bush 
among Latinos, but is widely considered to be as a weak 
Democratic choice for president. This is evident by his 
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thrashing in the election, 426-111 in the Electoral 
College. 
The alternative is that stronger Republican candidates 
will syphon Hispanic votes away from Democratic candidates. 
This may be true, but only in the instance that you get an 
election with a weak Democrat. Reagan was able to hold the 
percentage difference of Hispanic voters to less than 25% 
for both the 1980 and 1984 elections. George H.W. Bush, who 
was able to trounce Dukakis is the 1988 election lost 
Latino support in his bid for reelection in 1992. 
The next instance of a strong Republican candidate 
comes in the elections of 2000 and 2004. George W. Bush, a 
Texas Republican, was able to reduce the percentage 
difference from 27% to 18% in four years. This may be 
because George W. Bush had a much softer immigration stance 
than his Republican predecessors. This version of the 
hypothesis is unlikely though, because in both the 2000 and 
2004 elections the Democratic candidates can be considered 
strong contenders. Al Gore lost one of the closest 
contested elections in recent history, even winning the 
popular vote by over 500,000 votes nationwide. John Kerry 
was leading polls well into the late election season but 
lost by 35 electoral votes. Kerry was strong in support of 
immigration reform, keeping the border with Mexico open, 
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and providing citizenship for illegal immigrants who had 
been in the country without causing problems for over five 
years. An analysis by Leal, et al. (2005) disputes that 
Kerry lost Hispanic votes to Bush in Texas and that Bush 
was able to gather 59% of Latino support there. Latino 
support for the war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan is the 
most likely explanation for the Republican gain in Hispanic 
votes. 
Table 2: Percent Hispanic Voters for Democratic Party by 
State, 2004-2012 
Year AZ CA FL IL NV NM PA Total 
2004 73% 68% 44% 76% 60% 56% 72% 58% 
2008 74% 61% 57% 71% 76% 69% 72% 67% 
2012 70% 75% 60% 82% 70% 64% 80% 71% 
*Data from Pew Hispanic Center 2012 
When looking at a state-by-state analysis of states 
with a large Latino population in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 
elections, trends in Hispanic support can be seen. Table 2 
shows the percent of Hispanic vote for the Democratic Party 
candidate by state from 2004-2012. In only two cases did 
Hispanic support for the Democratic Party remain the same 
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or increase across all three elections. In every other 
situation Hispanic support either increased from 2004 to 
2008 then decreased from 2008 to 2012, or decreased from 
2004 to 2008 and increased from 2008 to 2012. This is 
interesting and peculiar given the strength of the 
Democratic candidates. John Kerry was able to outperform 
Obama among Latinos in 2008 in California, Illinois, and 
tied in Pennsylvania. These are all generally Democratic 
strongholds. However, Obama was able to make up ground in 
2012, running behind Kerry in the state of Arizona. 
Looking at Obama's elections specifically, his support 
among Latino voters has wavered in different states across 
both elections. In the southwest (Arizona, Nevada, and New 
Mexico) Obama actually lost support from Latinos in 2012 
compared to 2008. Other regions of the country proved to be 
more resilient for him. In California, Florida, Illinois, 
and Pennsylvania, Obama was able to widen his margin of 
Hispanic voters. Nowhere did Obama do better than 
California where he was able to increase turnout for the 
Democratic Party by a whopping 14% over 2008. The 
Democratic Party in general was able to increase its 
percentage of the Hispanic vote by 9% from 2004 to 2008 and 
by another 4% from 2008 to 2012. 
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Strong Democratic candidates like Clinton and Obama 
are able to increase the difference in Democratic and 
Republican Hispanic vote share greatly. Whereas John Kerry 
was only able to hold an 18% advantage over George W. Bush 
in 2004, Obama had widened this advantage to 44% over 
Romney in 2012. One reason for this could be Romney's 
strong opposition to immigration reform policy. Romney made 
several gaffes over his campaign, even writing off half of 
the electorate as lost to the Democratic Party in a private 
speech. Moreover, Democratic Hispanic gains have leapt from 
58% to 71% nationally in only three elections. I will argue 
that this is the start of the change in Hispanic voting 
patterns. 
Partisan lines are already forming between the 
Democrats and Republicans on a chief concern of Hispanic 
voters, immigration reform. Democrats have already 
recognized that embracing immigration reform for Hispanics 
in the United States will lead to a greater support. 
Republicans, though, have struggled with their message. 
Hispanic support for Republican candidates peaks at 40% in 
the 2004 election, but Bush is not the only Republican to 
receive Hispanic support. Reagan also received high levels 
of Hispanic support in both the 1980 and 1984 elections. As 
I have argued, Republican candidates received more Hispanic 
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support when they are from the Southwest or West, which is 
true in all cases, but the 2008 election. Arizona Senator, 
John McCain, was unable to translate his Southwestern 
heritage into Hispanic votes. 
Electoral shifts have occurred in Congress as well 
over the last few decades. The shift from Republican 
control in the 1990s to Democratic control in the 2000s has 
largely held since 2006. The Senate remained Democratic 
until 2010. If the concept of critical elections requires 
that a type of election occurs in which a sharp durable 
electoral realignment occurs between parties, for Hispanic 
voters, that was the 2008 presidential election. Why is 
this? I posit it is because the Hispanic population in the 
United States has grown dramatically over the last several 
decades. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
Variables 
To determine how Hispanic attitudes differ from other 
groups' voting behavior, I will perform three regression 
equations, one for Hispanics, one for whites, and one for 
blacks. 
The basic method of this study is a linear regression 
analysis. This is a widely used method testing various 
independent variables against a dependent variable that is 
a feeling thermometer. 
To perform my analyses I will use data from the 2012 
American National Election Studies data center. The ANES 
survey accurately reflects the population of the United 
States and thus is excellent for testing this question. 
This is the most up-to-date data set available from the 
ANES at this time. 
The ANES election study is a random sampling of 
responses from over 5000 voting aged Americans that come 
from many backgrounds. Information concerning this study 
can be found at the ANES website at 
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes 2012direct d 
emocracy/anes 2012direct_democracy.htm. 
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The dependent variable I will examine is a feeling 
thermometer toward the Democratic candidate in the 2012 
election. The use of a feeling thermometer as my dependent 
variable means that a linear regression analysis is 
appropriate. 
My independent variables will be sorted into three 
categories: moral values, foreign policy, and economic 
variables. 
Moral Values 
Moral issues play a strong role in Hispanic attitudes. 
Moral values can readily be defined here as attitudes or 
positions taken on hot button issues such as same-sex 
marriage, marijuana legalization, abortion rights, the 
death penalty, and the importance of religion. 
Given the shift from foreign policy to domestic 
policy, national security will be less prevalent in 
Hispanic voting decisions. Without those worries to fall 
back on to determine vote choice, what issues will 
Hispanics pay the most attention to? I argue that "moral 
values" will replace foreign policy as Hispanics flock back 
to the Democratic Party. A good indicator of issue 
importance to Hispanic voters would be a comparison of 
Hispanic responses to ANES questions on these subjects. 
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These responses can also be compared to responses from 
other voting ethnicities. 
I have taken three moral values variables from the 
ANES study. How much was the respondent in favor of 
abortion as a woman's choice? What is the respondent's 
position on same-sex marriage? Is religion an important 
part of the respondent's life? 
Foreign Policy 
One of the issues that the Republican Party advanced 
in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
was a message of national security. 
The Two-Presidencies Theory advanced by Aaron 
Wildavsky (1966) claims that there are two different 
presidencies, one for domestic politics and one for foreign 
politics. Republicans have traditionally been seen as the 
stronger party on national security issues (Fleisher and 
Bond 1988, Fleisher et al. 2000) although not all scholars 
agree (Parson 1994). 
The United States sent troops to Afghanistan shortly 
after the attacks on September 11th, 2001, its first major 
conflict since the Gulf War in 1991. There was a sense of 
patriotism and pride in the nation. Americans were out to 
exact revenge on those who had wronged them. The mission 
25 
and goals became increasingly murky as a resilient enemy 
hid out in the mountains of Afghanistan causing high 
casualties. 
Then, the United States entered into a second war in 
the Middle East. The Bush administration had been pushing a 
war with Iraq to topple a so called ~axis of evil." At the 
time there were few critics, and the nation reluctantly 
went along with the plan. Hispanics were also reluctant to 
support the administration (Pew Hispanic, 2007). Perhaps 
they saw the military as a good option for becoming 
citizens. In any event, George W. Bush was able to edge 
Republicans over the 40% Hispanic support mark for the 
first time in recent history. 
The Pew Hispanic Research Center's data previously 
discussed shows that the Republican Party lost nine percent 
of Hispanic support from their high water mark of 40% 
support in 2004 to the election of 2008. Another four 
percent was lost from 2008 to 2012. All thirteen percentage 
points were captured by the Democratic Party during that 
time. This leads me to speculate that Hispanic voters' 
concern with foreign policy issues dropped and there was a 
shift to domestic concerns. 
The 2012 ANES Time Series study does not ask any 
specific questions about the Iraq or Afghanistan conflicts, 
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so my variables for attitudes toward foreign policy had to 
be updated. One of the questions I used concerns Iran, 
which is a similarly located within the region. Should we 
try to stop Iran from developing a nuclear bomb by using 
air strikes? This question will test the attitudes of 
Hispanic voters toward foreign policy initiatives given the 
already lengthy existence of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts. The final two variables are about the nature of 
war in general. Is war worth the cost? Has war increased or 
decreased the threat of terrorism? These variables are 
indirect post-war evaluations to the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflict. 
Economics 
It is not a coincidence that economic concerns 
permeated the 2008 elections. Wildavsky (1966, p. 7) 
asserts that it is difficult for presidents to be effective 
at domestic policy unless under extraordinary crises such 
as Roosevelt's one hundred days during the Depression. 
While this topic is contentious among scholars, many agree 
that having a majority in Congress helps to mitigate 
opposition to domestic policy, which has been increasing 
partisan in recent years. Hispanic voters are not mute in 
all of this. Hispanic members of Congress, and indeed in 
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lower offices, are overwhelmingly Democratic. It stands to 
reason that domestic issues would prevail over foreign 
policy since it is a mainstay of the Democratic Party. 
Democratic superiority on economic issues goes back to 
before World War II. Much credit has been given to the 
Democratic Party for leading the country out of the Great 
Depression. The 1932 election is billed as another 
realigning election for the Democratic Party at the 
national level. Roosevelt won election running on bringing 
relief to the economic woes of the Great Depression. 
Similarly, Obama ran his 2008 campaign on relieving the 
financial crisis that started earlier that year. 
An analysis by Gosnell and Coleman (1940) of 
Democratic vote change in Pennsylvania counties from 1928-
1936 found there was a negative correlation in Democratic 
vote between 1928 and 1932 and a positive correlation 
between 1932 and 1936. W.A. Kerr (1944) examined the 
correlations of economic indices with the conservative 
vote, which was defined as the Whig vote prior to 1856, and 
the Republican vote thereafter. His analysis led to the 
conclusion that there was only modest support at best for 
his hypothesis. These cases show that support for the 
Democratic Party rises as the Great Depression takes its 
toll. The Democratic Party, just as in 2008, was able to 
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demonstrate an ability to relate to those who were out of 
work and translate it into votes. I argue that the 
Democratic Party has been able to do this among Hispanic 
voters on economic issues. 
Work by Cain et al. (1991) tests what best explains 
Hispanic partisanship. They propose a "minority group 
status hypothesis," suggesting that there is a perceived 
economic discrimination Hispanics feel which drives them 
toward the Democratic Party. Democrats have historically 
fought for minority rights. They also find no support for 
the theory of "economic advancement." This theory posits 
that as economic status increases, second and third-
generation Hispanics are more likely to become Republicans 
than first-generation Hispanics. As the Democratic Party 
gains Hispanic voters they are retaining them over time. 
Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) assert the argument that 
Republicans can potentially win over Hispanic voters by 
advancing issues that they believe will appeal to them. 
Issue voting is a compelling strategy given its prevalence 
in the literature (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Jackson 1975; 
Page and Brody 1972). 
I have included two economic variable measures on 
various topics, including reducing the deficit and how well 
the economy is performing. The specific questions asked for 
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the economic variables are as follows. What is the 
respondent's view of the state of the economy? Will the 
economy be better or worse if a Democratic candidate wins? 
Moral variables, as I hypothesize, are related to 
support for the Democratic Party in different ways, too. 
Democrats support the right of a woman to choose an 
abortion and are in support of abortion in the case of 
incest or rape. Most Democrats support same-sex marriage. 
However, there is more of split on whether to legalize 
marijuana. It is considered a progressive platform agenda. 
Most Democratic candidates also report attending some sort 
of religious service. On foreign policy, Democrats tend to 
favor diplomacy first, even if they view another country as 
a threat. Historically, Democrats have been viewed as 
having presided over the best of economic times. President 
Roosevelt helped pull the country out of the Great 
Depression, and President Obama helped keep the country out 
of a second depression. The next two sections will examine 
how Hispanic voters differ from white and black voters. 
How Hispanic Voters Differ from White Voters 
Filer, Kenney, and Morton (1993) show that voter 
participation in non-white counties is lower than in white 
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counties, even after controlling for education and income 
(p.80). Voter turnout from 1948-1980 dropped then to rose 
as families move up the income distribution (p. 63). 
Research by Mccartney, Bishaw, and Fontenot (2013) for the 
U.S. Census Bureau shows that 23% of the Hispanic 
population in the United States lives in poverty, which is 
double the national average. What does this mean for 
Hispanics? Having large numbers of Hispanics in poverty 
means that turnout should be low. This hasn't shown to be 
the case necessarily for Hispanics. Data from the Pew 
Research Hispanic Trends (2013) report shows that 48% of 
voting eligible Hispanics turned out to the polls in the 
2012 election, down 1% from 2008. 
According to the Pew Hispanic Report by Lopez and 
Gonzalez-Barrera (2012), Hispanics are consistently voting 
at a rate almost twenty percentage points lower than whites 
or blacks. In the 2012 election, black voters actually 
turned out to vote at two and half percentage points higher 
than white voters for the first time ever. 
I have already demonstrated that Hispanics supported 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, their support 
has fallen off sharply, as indicated in the shift from 
Republican support in 2004 to Democratic support in 2008 
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and 2012. President Obama, according to Roper Center Data 
(2014), was only able to obtain 39% of the white vote, 
versus 71% of the Hispanic vote. Don't let this be 
misleading, however, as Hispanics are a much small portion 
of the population than white voters. 
I argue that Hispanic voters support the Democratic 
Party on moral grounds more often than whites, simply 
because "moral" white voters will identify with the 
conservative message more than that of the liberal message. 
Bafumi and Shapiro (2009) show, in a linear regression 
model which predicts party identification, that southern 
White voters have become more Republican over time. 
Given these differences, I can hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Hispanic voters are more likely than white 
voters to support the Democratic candidate because of 
foreign policy. 
Hypothesis 2: Hispanic voters more likely than white voters 
to support the Democratic candidate because of economic 
conditions. 
Hypothesis 3: Hispanic voters are more likely than white 
voters to support the Democratic candidate because of moral 
values. 
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How Hispanic Voters Differ from B1ack Voters 
When talking about Hispanic voter participation it can 
be helpful to have a base to compare the data to. As I 
mentioned previously, academic research prior to the 1960's 
largely grouped voters together into one bloc. Since that 
period there has been extensive research into African-
American voting behavior. Peterson and Gabbidon (2007) 
break the analysis of prior research down into three 
categories: socioeconomic, empowerment, and age. 
Their summary of the literature shows many authors 
have found that African American voter turnout rises along 
with higher income and greater education (Matthews and 
Prothro, 1966; Peterson and Somit, 1997; Salamon and Van 
Evera, 1973; Verba and Nie, 1972), greater empowerment, 
which are communities with black mayors or elected 
officials (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp, 2004; Bobo and 
Gilliam, 1990; Danigelis, 1977; and Peterson and Somit 
1992, 1997), and age, whereas older black voters are more 
involved, as is the case with older Americans in general 
(Peterson and Somit, 1992, 1994, 1997). However, none of 
this research compares African American voting attitudes 
against that of Latinos. I have already shown that the 
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existing Hispanic voting behavior literature does not do 
this either. 
As of the 2008 elections, white voters made up nearly 
three quarters of all voters in the United States, down 
from four fifths eight years prior. It can be reasonably 
assumed that a little over half of that bloc will vote for 
the Republican Party. African Americans, on the other hand, 
are a solid voting bloc of the Democratic Party. African 
Americans and Hispanics provide a roughly equal percentage 
of the total vote, although the black vote is much more 
supportive of the Democratic Party. 
The percentage of the population of Hispanics (16%) 
and blacks (13%) is roughly the same, despite a nearly 
twenty percent gap in actual voter participation in the two 
groups. I reasonably assume that Hispanics will behave in a 
similar fashion when compared to black voters because they 
are both minorities. 
Given these differences, I can hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: Hispanic voters are as likely as black voters 
to support the Democratic candidate because of foreign 
policy. 
Hypothesis 5: Hispanic voters are as likely as black voters 
to support the Democratic candidate because of economic 
conditions. 
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Hypothesis 6: Hispanic voters are as likely as black voters 
to support the Democratic candidate based because of moral 
values. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
For my analysis I have performed three regression 
equations: one for Hispanics, one for Whites, and one for 
Blacks using the 2012 American National Election Study 
survey. My dependent variable is a feeling thermometer of 
the Democratic candidate for president in 2012. My 
independent variables were broken down into three 
categories: moral values, foreign policy, and the economy. 
Table 3 reports the results of my first regression 
equation. The R squared value, at .46, is strong, and 
explains a significant amount of variance. Examining the 
beta weights, this table shows that Hispanics are less 
likely to support the Democratic candidate on abortion and 
more likely to support them on the issue of same-sex 
marriage; however whether or not religion was important in 
the support of a Democratic candidate was not statistically 
significant. Hispanics are also likely to support the 
Democratic candidate based on an anti-war stance and their 
policy on terrorism. The condition of the economy was the 
strongest for Hispanics, and the b value is about the same 
as it is for whites. This is significant and has a negative 
effect on the approval ratings of the Democratic candidate. 
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Table 3: Hispanic Feelings toward the Democratic Candidate 
Variable B Std. Beta T Sig. 
Error 
Constant 83.19 4.36 19.06 
Mora1 Va1ues 
Abortion -.97 .38 -.12 -2.52 
Gay Marriage 2.71 1.11 .08 2.44 
Religion 2.48 2.38 .03 1. 04 
Foreign Po1icy 
Bomb Iran? .36 .88 .03 .40 
War worth cost? 4.12 1. 24 .12 3.30 
Increased 3.93 1. 06 .14 3.69 
terrorism? 
Economic 
State of Economy .51 .88 .04 .58 
Econ. Better/Worse? -24.59 1. 29 -.69 -18.93 
Dependent variable: Feeling Thermometer of Democratic Candidate for President. 
Adjusted R sq. value: .46; * is statistically significant greater than .05; N=l005 
Table 4 reports the results of my second regression 
.00* 
.01* 
.01* 
.29 
. 68 
.00* 
.00* 
.56 
.00* 
equation. The R squared value for Whites is the strongest 
of all the groups at .61. Examining the beta weights shows 
that Whites, too, are less likely to support the Democrat 
on abortion, and only slightly support them on same sex-
marriage. Neither of these results is statistically 
significant. What is significant in terms of moral values 
is their support of Democrats based on religion. Foreign 
policy is a strong positive for Democratic support among 
Whites. All three variables are statistically significant 
with the strongest support for the Democratic candidate 
coming for their stance on dealing with Iran. Economics, 
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too, is very strong. Both measures were found statistically 
significant, but are negative, indicating that their views 
of the Democratic candidate were degraded. 
Table 4: White Feelings toward the Democratic Candidate 
Variable B Std. Beta T 
Error 
Constant 73.23 1. 52 48.10 
Moral Values 
Abortion -.23 .16 -.02 -1. 4 7 
Gay Marriage .34 .45 .01 .76 
Religion 7.94 .68 .14 11. 57 
Foreign Policy 
Bomb Iran? 3.84 .35 .27 10.93 
War worth cost? 1. 89 .35 .07 5.27 
Increased 3.46 .40 .11 8.64 
terrorism? 
Economic 
State of Economy -3.80 .37 -.26 -10.03 
Econ. Better/Worse? -23.67 .52 -.68 -45.56 
Dependent variable: Feeling Thermometer of Democratic Candidate for President. 
Adjusted R sq. value: .61; * is statistically significant greater than .05; N~3495 
Table 5 reports my results for my third regression 
Sig. 
.00* 
.14 
.44 
.00* 
.00* 
.00* 
.00* 
.00* 
.00* 
equation. The R squared value for Blacks is significantly 
lower than Whites or Hispanics. This could simply be 
because their support is less influenced by the independent 
variables than other groups. In short, they are very loyal 
supporters of the Democratic Party. The R squared value is 
.17. Examining the beta weights, only same-sex marriage 
generates positive views of the Democratic Party among 
African Americans. Neither abortion nor religion was 
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statistically significant among moral values measures. Both 
the cost of war and the stance on Iran generated positive 
views of the Democratic candidate, with the stance on Iran 
the strongest of the three groups. 
Table 5: Black Feelings toward the Democratic Candidate 
Variable B Std. Beta T 
Error 
Constant 88.28 1. 74 50.53 
Moral. Val.ues 
Abortion .06 .28 .00 .02 
Gay Marriage 2.07 .60 .15 3.42 
Religion 1. 34 1. 05 .06 1.27 
Foreign Pol.icy 
Bomb Iran? 2.75 .48 .37 5.68 
War worth cost? 1. 81 .59 .13 3.05 
Increased -.25 .73 -.01 -.35 
terrorism? 
Economic 
State of Economy -3.07 .55 -.33 -5.55 
Econ. Better/Worse? -8.27 .93 -.44 -8.89 
Dependent variable: Feeling Thermometer of Democratic Candidate for President. 
Adjusted R sq. value: .17; * is statistically significant greater than .05; N-1016 
The increased threat of terrorism was not statistically 
significant. Both economic measures were significant, 
Sig. 
.00* 
.98 
.00* 
.20 
.00* 
.00* 
.72 
.00* 
.00* 
however. Blacks had a less favorable view of the Democratic 
candidate in both instances. 
When we compare Hispanic data in Table 3 to White 
feelings for the Democratic candidate in Table 4 using the 
beta weights (standardized regression coefficients) we can 
see that a comparison is difficult because the two groups 
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care about different issues. Abortion and same-sex marriage 
are statistically significant to Hispanics, but not to 
Whites. Likewise, Religion is significant to Whites and not 
Hispanics. Foreign policy provides an easier comparison. 
Hispanics have stronger feelings than whites in both 
statistically significant measures of foreign policy. 
Although the Democratic position on Iran was significant 
for Whites, it is not for Hispanics. On the question of the 
economy, both Whites and Hispanics shared equally negative 
feelings toward the Democratic candidate. 
Comparing Hispanic feelings in Table 3 to the feelings 
of Blacks in Table 5 nets a similar result. The one 
statistically significant finding for Black voters was 
same-sex marriage, with Black feelings in support for 
Democratic candidates greater than those of Hispanics. 
Black voter's feelings about Democrats are influenced less 
than Hispanic views on abortion and more on religion, 
though neither is statistically significant. Feelings for 
the Democratic candidate were very positive on Iran and the 
cost of the war, but not significant for the threat of 
terrorism. On the measure of whether the war was worth the 
cost, Blacks and Hispanics shared positive feelings toward 
the Democratic candidate at about the same rate. 
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Of the economic metrics, only the question of the 
economy getting better or worse was statistically 
significant across all three groups. However, it resulted 
in less support for the Democratic candidate in all three 
groups as well. This effect is strongest among Hispanics, 
followed closely by Whites, and to a lesser extent Blacks. 
Based on the state of the economy, Blacks and Whites felt 
more negatively about the Democratic candidate. When they 
felt the economy was worse, this was statistically 
insignificant for Hispanic supporters. 
I will now shift to the second part of this analysis, 
to explain which variables have stronger or weaker 
influence between the groups. When looking at the moral 
values measures of all three groups, abortion has the 
strongest influence on Hispanics, followed by Whites, then 
Blacks. Same-sex marriage also has the strongest influence 
among Hispanics. It has the next highest influence on 
Blacks, and then Whites. Religion is three times more 
influential among Whites than Hispanics, and nearly six 
times as influential as it is for Blacks. 
Foreign policy is the key category for Whites. Iran 
had the strongest influence on their feelings toward the 
Democratic candidate, edging Blacks, and leaving Hispanics 
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behind. However, the cost of the war and the threat of 
terrorism were both most influential among Hispanics, 
followed by Whites, and then Blacks. 
Turning to the economic variable measurements, the 
state of the economy was most influential to Whites, 
followed by Blacks, and lastly Latinos. For the metric of 
the economy being better or worse, Hispanics felt the most 
influence, followed by Whites, and Blacks felt the least 
influence. It should be noted that all of the influence 
economically was negative. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conc1usions 
This discussion will be broken down into two parts. 
First I will talk about which variables are relatively more 
important to each group, and then I will discuss for which 
group a specific variable has the greatest impact. In 
examining the tables, high positive values and high 
negative values represent opposite ends of the spectrum 
from each other. 
For Hispanics the top variables in each measure were 
gay marriage, whether the war was worth the cost, and if 
the economy was better or worse. The measure of the economy 
was deeply negative. The condition of the economy was the 
strongest for Hispanics, and the b value is about the same 
as it is for whites. This is significant and has a negative 
effect on the approval ratings of the Democratic candidate. 
Each of these variables was statistically significant at 
the .05 level. 
For Whites the top variables in each measure were 
religion, the question of whether to bomb Iran, and if the 
economy was better or worse. Again, the economic measure 
was strongly negative. All three of these variables were 
statistically significant for white supporters. 
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For Blacks the top variables in each measure were gay 
marriage, the question of whether to bomb Iran, and if the 
economy was better or worse. Again, the economic measure 
was negative, but not nearly as negative as either 
Hispanics or Whites. All three variables were statically 
significant for Black supporters. 
The second part of this discussion breaks down which 
group each particular variable has the greatest impact on. 
As a reminder, my three measures of moral values are 
abortion, gay marriage, and religion. My three measures of 
foreign policy are the question to bomb Iran, whether the 
war was worth the cost, and increased terrorism. My two 
measures of the economy were the state of the economy and 
if the economy was better or worse. The strongest value 
will be the highest reported value, whether it is positive 
or negative. 
My measure of moral values has three variables. The 
first variable, abortion, has the biggest impact on 
Hispanic voters, as indicated by the unstandardized 
coefficient of -.97. Gay marriage also has the strongest 
effect of Hispanics, with an unstandardized coefficient of 
2.71. Religion has the strongest effect on White 
supporters, with an unstandardized coefficient of 7.94. 
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My measure of foreign policy also has three variables. 
The first variable, whether we should bomb Iran, has the 
greatest impact on White supporters, with an unstandardized 
coefficient of 3.84. The question of whether the war in 
Iraq was worth the cost had the greatest impact on 
Hispanics, with an unstandardized regression coefficient of 
4.12. The question of whether terrorism has increased also 
had the greatest impact on Hispanics, with an 
unstandardized regression coefficient of 3.93. 
My measure of economics has two variables. The first 
variable, the state of the economy, had the strongest 
influence on White supporters, with an unstandardized 
regression coefficient of -3.80. The second variable, 
whether the economy was better or worse, had the greatest 
impact on Hispanics, with an unstandardized regression 
coefficient of -24.59. 
Keeping a count of the impact of variables, five of 
the eight variables had the greatest impact on Hispanics. 
The other three impacted Whites the most. Taking a closer 
look at the three variables shows that Hispanics were only 
second behind Whites on religion. Blacks were impacted 
slightly less than Whites on the question to bomb Iran and 
the state of the economy. 
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While these results are interesting to say the least 
there are a few things that we can conclude. Hispanic voter 
views of the Democratic candidate for president were more 
influenced by abortion and same-sex marriage than Whites. 
These were the only two statistically significant moral 
value indicators among Hispanics. Whites were more likely 
to support the Democratic candidate based on religion. This 
was statistically significant for Whites, however, and not 
Hispanics. So it is plausible to say that Hispanics support 
the Democratic candidate more than Whites based on moral 
values issues, with the caveat that different values matter 
to each group at varying levels. 
The same could be said about foreign policy, where 
Hispanics and Whites both supported the Democratic 
candidate more. That being said, Hispanics were more 
positive than Whites in both statistically significant 
categories. This means that our second hypothesis is also 
plausible. Hispanics are more likely than Whites to support 
the Democratic candidate on foreign policy. 
The economic metric was strongest, though deeply 
negative, for both Hispanics and Whites. Not only do 
Hispanics not support the Democratic candidate when they 
feel the economy is bad, they do so overwhelmingly, edging 
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out White only slightly. A lower unstandardized regression 
coefficient (B in the table) than White supporters would 
show less influence on Hispanics than Whites. This, 
however, is not the case because it is negatively signed. 
My third hypothesis, that Hispanics are more likely to 
support the Democratic candidate than Whites on economic 
issues, is not supported. 
How, then, do Hispanic supporters compare to Black 
supporters? Hispanics and Blacks are similarly as likely 
to support the Democratic candidate on same-sex marriage, 
with Hispanics only marginally more likely. This was the 
only measurement that both were statistically significant 
on. Give that this variable is measured three different 
ways and they only share one in common, I am unable to 
confirm that Hispanics are as likely to support the 
Democratic candidate as Blacks. Other variables may 
corroborate this is future works. 
Hispanics were, in fact, more likely than Blacks to 
support the Democratic candidate on whether the war was 
worth the cost. This provides that they are at least as 
likely as Blacks to support the Democratic candidate on 
foreign policy. Again, however, this was the only shared 
variable of statistical significance. Hispanics were more 
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likely to support the president on Iran, and Blacks more 
likely based on the threat of increased terrorism. 
Hispanics are also less likely than Blacks to support 
the Democratic candidate based on economic issues. Both 
groups are statistically significant for the question of 
whether the economy was getting better or worse. Hispanics, 
however, were nearly three times less likely to support the 
Democratic candidate as Black supporters. This does not 
lend sufficient support to my sixth hypothesis that 
Hispanics are as likely to support the Democratic candidate 
on economic issues. 
When looking at the influence of the variables as a 
whole, not their constituent parts, moral values have the 
most influence on Hispanics, and the economy and foreign 
policy have the most influence on Whites and to a lesser 
extent Blacks. These issues just weren't as important in 
influencing Hispanic voters as they were for the other 
races. This is curious given the high rate of poverty in 
the Hispanic community. The fact that foreign policy plays 
less of a role in influencing their support for the 
Democratic candidate could mean that either they take their 
traditional liberal stance of diplomacy first, in which 
case they wouldn't need much influencing, or several years 
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of multiple wars has caused them to focus less on foreign 
policy and more on moral values. 
What sort of implications does this have pertaining to 
this analysis? Only hypotheses one, two, and five were 
supported. Hypotheses three, four and six were either not 
supported or inconclusive give the information in this 
analysis. This is not surprising given the limited nature 
of this study, and may raise more questions than it 
answers. 
The Hispanic sub-group is a very diverse and changing 
population, which will only continue to grow in the United 
States. If this analysis is any indication, Hispanics will 
continue to look for moral values, which can be said to 
include immigration reform, for influence. As I have 
speculated, foreign policy, whether as a means to 
citizenship or not, will be less influential in future 
elections, as will the frail and healing economy. These 
will continue to play the strongest role among White 
voters, who make up a far more substantial portion of the 
population than either Hispanics or African Americans. 
Interestingly, the analysis of Hispanic support 
refutes Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler's (2008) conclusion 
that moral issues are more important to Hispanics than 
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economic ones. The measure of the economy was the strongest 
variable. A Hispanic secular realignment to the Democratic 
Party may not be sharp or durable enough to be maintained 
from one election to another. Hispanics may still be riding 
the fence, so to speak, on many issues, especially when 
compared to White and Black voters. The results of this 
analysis pertain to presidential elections only. Separate 
analysis would be required to test whether Hispanics show 
the same level of support congressional elections on years 
when there is not a presidential election. 
How, then, does this finding affect how I expect 
Hispanics to vote for president in future elections? 
Reexamining the variables and trends from previous 
elections, Democratic candidates that are able to move to 
the middle successfully will continue to gather new voters, 
especially Hispanics. The Democratic Party stance on key 
issues, such as immigration policy, has all but ensured 
that the majority of Hispanic voters will be faithful. The 
Republican Party has shown an ability to siphon the 
Hispanic vote away when their candidate can also move to 
the middle of the political spectrum (al la. George W. 
Bush) . Moving into the 2016 election, I expect that the 
Democratic Party will continue to hold a large portion of 
so 
the Hispanic voters they turned out in 2012 due to the 
inability of the Republican Party to move to the center. 
The Republican Party has been moving further to the right 
since the turn of the century. Moderate presidential 
candidates in the post-Bush era (McCain, Romney) have not 
been able to separate themselves from his policy mistakes 
that have grown sour with Hispanics, and voters in general. 
It will be interesting to see how Hispanics vote in future 
presidential elections and how these issues shape their 
support for the Democratic Party. 
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